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Knowledge plays a vital role in our life in that it reflects
how we understand the world around us and thus
determines how we act upon it. In this sense, knowledge
is of particular importance for designers because they act
to shape our world. Conventionally, knowledge creation
has been assumed by (design) research. However
developments of using practice within research have
pointed to knowledge creation within and through
practice. This has raised the question about the meaning,
role and format of knowledge in both research and
practice, and about the compatibility between both.
In due course, the research presented in this paper has set
out to investigate the concept of knowledge with regard
to this question. The paper begins by considering some of
the main problems with knowledge in research in design,
and more generally in the creative and practice-led
disciplines. It then examines the meaning of knowledge
in relation to its philosophical foundations. On this basis,
the discussion reconsiders the meaning, role and format
of knowledge, and the impact of this for the conduct of
research.

1 INTRODUCTION: WHY ASK?
This research investigates the question ‘What is the
meaning, role and format of knowledge in research and
practice?’ This question has arisen for design in the UK,
as well as more generally for creative and practice-led
disciplines (CPDs), because research regulations and
requirements in the UK remain silent about what
knowledge and understanding means in the context of
their specifications while implicitly prioritising
propositional knowledge (Author’s reference 2007).
This has led to a number of problems concerning the role
and format of knowledge in research and practice in the
UK. For example, one problem concerning the role and
format of knowledge arises due to the implicit
prioritisation of propositional knowledge, because its
language-based mode seems to exclude certain kinds or
formats of knowledge associated with practice, which
evade verbal articulation (which is often called practical,
experiential, personal, or tacit knowledge). Polanyi
(1958: 50) puts the importance that practitionerresearchers assign to practical knowledge succinctly into
words:
Rules of art can be useful, but they do not
determine the practice of an art; they are maxims,
which can serve as a guide to an art only if they
can be integrated into the practical knowledge of
the art. They cannot replace this knowledge.
‘Rules of art’ in this context refers to subject specific
knowledge expressed in form of theories (maxims).
Polanyi indicates that, while useful, there is another kind
of practical or personal knowledge that is necessary to
complement this theoretical knowledge to make it
applicable. However, what exactly this knowledge is and
how it can be included in research has remained elusive.
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This has created problems with the inclusion of practical
knowledge in research, or in turn with the applicability of
research findings in practice.
Researchers in the creative disciplines have tried to
overcome the problem through the use of creative
practice in research in order to achieve the inclusion of
tacit knowledge, which in turn has caused debate about
what is formally accepted as knowledge in research.
(Author’s reference 2006). Consequently, this research
sets out to review current concepts and understandings of
knowledge and their relationships with regard to the
implications for research in design and other creative and
practice-led disciplines. The aim of this inquiry is to help
clarify the role, format and inclusion of tacit
(experiential) knowledge in these disciplines, in
particular as regards its inclusion through the use of
creative practice, and to identify potential solutions or
ways of dealing with the identified problems.
While this investigation has evolved from a national
problem in the UK, the problem has also proven to be
one of international significance, which is attested by
many international discussion lists concerned with this
problem (e.g. PhD-design <http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk>),
conferences (e.g. Research into Practice <http://www.
herts.ac.uk/artdes1/research/res2prac/confhome.html>),
and publications (e.g. Durling et al. 2002). In this paper,
the problem is therefore discussed on a generic level in
order to maintain its international relevance. Similarly,
while the problem is one of particular relevance to
design, it is also shared by the wider community of
creative and practice-led disciplines and here discussed
as such. In explanation and justification of such a generic
understanding, which also accommodates subjectspecific individualities, Starszakowna 2002 argues that
the concept of knowledge in art and design is, or
should be, no different from the concept of
knowledge in other disciplines. It is the constant
search for, and ultimately the acquisition and
dissemination of, a body of knowledge within
particular areas or parameters which signifies a
specific discipline. While the particular form that
this knowledge might take will therefore vary,
both between disciplines and within specialist
areas within disciplines, such acquisition of
knowledge is universal. (Abstract)
A final aspect that might need clarification is the
distinction between research and practice, which is used
in this paper, because one may occur in the context of the
other. For example, a practitioner might also work in the
academy and pursue research to inform their practice.
Therefore, as distinguished previously (author’s
reference 2005), the term ‘research’ is being used to
denote the systematic inquiry to the end of gaining new
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knowledge, and a ‘researcher’ is a person who pursues
research (e.g. in design). ‘Practice’ is used to refer to
professional practice (e.g. in design) or to processes
usually used in professional practice to produce
professional work for any purpose other than the
(deliberate) acquisition of knowledge. ‘Practitioner’
accordingly refers to anyone who works in professional
practice.

2 WHAT IS MISSING?
This section examines two examples from CPDs in order
to draw out more clearly the problems of knowledge in
research, how these problems are related to the
prioritisation of propositional knowledge, and how the
practice knowledge of these disciplines is different.
Before we look at the examples, we need to clarify what
we mean by propositional knowledge. Propositional
knowledge is most commonly defined as “justified true
belief”. Grayling (2003: 37) explains that
this definition looks plausible because, at the very
least, it seems that to know something one must
believe it, that the belief must be true, and that
one’s reason for believing it must be satisfactory
in the light of some criteria – for one could not be
said to know something if one’s reasons for
believing it were arbitrary or haphazard. So each
of the three parts of the definition appears to
express a necessary condition for knowledge, and
the claim is that, taken together, they are
sufficient.
Despite of continued criticism, the definition of
knowledge as “justified true belief” has remained the
prevailing definition, and [the author (2007)] has shown
that this understanding of propositional knowledge is
implicit in the definition of research because of
additional requirements such as the textual/ written
presentation of an intellectual position (proposition,
thesis – ‘true belief’), because of the logic of verification
and defence of this intellectual position through
argument and evidence (justification), and the
requirement for generalisability/transferability and
explicit and unambiguous communication.
The following two examples show that there arise
difficulties with this conventional understanding of
research at different stages, and that it is at those stages
that tacit knowledge is missing. One of the selected two
examples is from design/engineering, the other from
music. The examples have been drawn from existing
literature which is concerned with the problem of
knowledge in relation to practice. They have been chosen
because they offer discussion of two important generic
knowledge areas of CPD’s, one of which is related to
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procedural knowledge and expertise using the example of
technical development, the other is related to experiential
knowledge and connoisseurship, using the example of
aesthetic evaluation and judgment.
Example 1: In the 1960’s, a Canadian research
laboratory successfully developed and built a so-called
TEA-laser. British attempts to replicate the laser on the
basis of written information or a third-person-informant
however failed as long as the tacit knowledge of
informants who had participated in building the original
laser was not included through their personal engagement
in the replication-project (Collins 1985, Neuweg 2002:
42). Collins’ (1985) study of the replication attempts
further showed that an extended period of contact was
required between the expert and the learner to transfer the
tacit knowledge, and that the learner could not tell
whether they had acquired the relevant knowledge or
skill until they tried it.
This example suggests that tacit knowledge is developed
within the research process and as part of the research
(here: the development of the laser), and that it evades
the conventional textual communication means of
research. Polanyi (1958: 53) describes this situation as
follows:
An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot
be transmitted by prescription, since no
prescription for it exists. It can be passed on only
by example from master to apprentice.
In summary, knowledge which ‘cannot be specified’ is
usually associated with practical knowledge and skill. It
belongs to vocational training and is (today) widely
regarded as distinct and excluded from academic
research, because it withstands articulation and
argumentation and thus wider dissemination (Herbig et
al. 2001). Nevertheless the inclusion of tacit knowledge
seems essential for success, both in terms of tacit
knowledge being brought into the research process as
well as in terms of its communication for application, and
is therefore associated with expertise, which can be
defined as “an intuitive grasp of the situation and a nonanalytic and non-deliberative sense of the appropriate
response to be made” (Berliner 1994: 110).
Example 2: for the second example, I want to draw on
an example which Polanyi uses and which concerns the
‘touch’ of pianists (Polanyi 1958: 50). He makes the
observation that, technically, it is difficult to account for
the difference in touch, which is so prized, and which
distinguishes any great pianist. Also, it seems fairly
impossible to describe it sufficiently either for the
purpose of teaching, or for the purpose of evaluation.
This becomes clearer if we cast this example in terms of
research. If one were to conduct a comparative study
between the ‘touch’ of different pianists, how were we to
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measure and evaluate the different ‘touches’ if they
evade scientific measurement and analysis? In this case,
judgement would need to rely on (perceptual) experience
and personal judgement, also known as connoisseurship.
Connoisseurship in the context of this investigation is
referring to an ability for very fine (qualitative)
discrimination that is (usually) beyond scientific
measurement and that is acquired through extensive
training (Polanyi 1958: 54, Beeston and Higgs 2001:
110).
In these two examples, we have seen that tacit knowledge
is an important requirement for achieving best results in
research and practice, which is associated with expertise
and connoisseurship. In particular, tacit knowledge plays
an important role both in the research process and in
evaluating and communicating research outcomes. In
other words, tacit knowledge seems important for the
generation and application as well as the experience and
judgement of research and its results, and for creating
new experiences, abilities, and knowledge. In the
following, we shall examine what exactly we understand
with tacit knowledge, why and how it has this important
role, and how it relates to propositional knowledge,
drawing on philosophical sources in order to give the
discussion a better grounding.

3 WHAT KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE?
Above, we have talked about two different kinds of
knowledge, tacit and propositional, but these two terms
are not usually paired. Rather, ‘tacit knowledge’ tends to
be paired with ‘explicit knowledge’ (Neuweg 2002).
‘Propositional knowledge’ is variously paired with ‘nonpropositional knowledge’ such as experiential or
perceptual knowledge, (knowledge by acquaintance)
and/or ‘procedural knowledge’. (Williams 2001: 98,
Grayling 2003). While the explicit - tacit knowledge-pair
has been formed to denote and distinguish knowledge by
the characteristic of communication, propositional and
non-propositional knowledge pairs provide distinctions
concerning their nature. However, the relationship
between propositional and non-propositional knowledge
seems not as clear-cut as that of explicit and tacit
knowledge, because we find a number of different kinds
of knowledge clustered under ‘non-propositional
knowledge’.
In the creative and practice-led disciplines, a variety of
further terms are being used such as practical knowledge,
skills knowledge, process knowledge, personal
knowledge, implicit knowledge, professional knowledge,
situational knowledge, control knowledge, complex
knowledge, conventional knowledge, cognitive
knowledge, codified knowledge, public knowledge…
(e.g. Polanyi 1958, Reber 1989, Higgs and Titchen 1995,
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Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, Refsum 2002, Eraut 2003,
e.g. Abidi, et al. 2005, Miles, et al. 2005). Most of these
terms seem to have been created as descriptors for
different kinds of phenomena of knowledge. While some
of them offer important distinctions for their field, to
discuss all of these terms in detail is beyond the scope of
this paper. This research will therefore focus on the
distinction between propositional and non-propositional,
and explicit and tacit knowledge, which seem to be the
most important pairs, in order to investigate in more
detail their meaning and their relationship. Where
possible I will point out and differentiate synonym terms.
Since knowledge is essentially a philosophical concept,
in the following the investigation is looking at
philosophical concepts of knowledge before reintroducing them into the problematic of CPDs. Although
there are also a number of different terms of knowledge
used in philosophy, there seems to be some consent about
what the central terms are: propositional knowledge,
knowledge by acquaintance, and procedural knowledge
(e.g. Hospers 1990, e.g. Williams 2001, Grayling 2003).
Grayling (2003: 39) explains that the definition of
knowledge as justified true belief “is intended to be an
analysis of knowledge in the propositional sense” rather
than of knowledge that one might gain by being
acquainted with something or someone, or that enables
someone to do something (skill), and that it is the kind of
knowledge that has predominantly occupied philosophy.
While there has been much debate about this definition
of knowledge in the attempt to defeat or improve it, until
now it has remained the central definition. An extensive
and plausible defence is provided by Williams (2001)
who proposes an approach that can be seen as a
mediating way between the two opposed positions of
Foundationalism and Coherentism. While
Foundationalism relies on foundational beliefs based on
empiricism for the justification of knowledge (‘prior
grounding requirement’) which creates problems with
accounting for any internal reality or the reality of other
minds (Williams 2001: 81ff), Coherentism relies on an
intrinsically coherent system of beliefs that in turn has
difficulties with accounting for our knowledge of
(external) reality (Williams 2001: 117ff).
In mediation of these two approaches, Williams (2001:
159-172) proposes a third approach, which he calls
‘Contextualism’ and which assumes that we can rely on
our experience of external reality until we have reasons
to challenge it (default and challenge requirement).
Context-dependent, this allows us to assume certain
beliefs as foundational beliefs without the requirement of
foundational atomism, but it also releases us from the
circularity of Coherentism. These assumed foundational
beliefs may be opened to scrutiny if the context changes.
William argues that this approach is permissible because
of the normativity of knowledge, which is not some aDesign Inquiries 2007: Mapping Knowledge in Design Research

priori given, but itself a human construct. The
Contextualist approach seems to describe the way in
which research operates well in that it takes certain
beliefs as foundational on which it then tries to construct
a coherent argument (cf. Author 2007). In the following
discussion, I will therefore adhere to Williams’
contextualist approach to (propositional) knowledge.
While propositional knowledge has been at the centre of
epistemological discussion, knowledge by acquaintance
and procedural knowledge seem to have been underrepresented in these discussions, and although
philosophers have looked at these concepts separately
(e.g. BonJour 2001, Gunther 2003, e.g. Maund 2003,
Crane 2005), a satisfactory integration of these issues
with epistemology so far seems outstanding. The next
section therefore examines the intrinsic characteristics of
these concepts in an attempt to relate them for the
purpose of this research.

4 RELATING DIFFERENT KINDS OF
KNOWLEDGE
Having discussed the definition of propositional
knowledge above, we now need to look more closely at
the characteristics of propositional knowledge.
Propositional knowledge, which is also associated with
the aspect of knowing-that, is usually expressed in form
of statements that can be verified, or falsified, and that
allow us to credibly believe that something is one way or
another. In this context, it may be useful to mention
Williams’ distinction between knowledge and
understanding as the difference between knowing-that
and knowing-why (Williams 2001: 42). Understanding in
this sense is more comprehensive than propositional
knowledge because it means not just knowing that
something is the way it is, but also knowing why it is the
way it is.
In contrast, procedural knowledge refers to knowing
“how to do something in the sense of an ability or skill”
(Grayling 2003: 38). Sternberg (1999) associates
procedural knowledge with tacit knowledge, because its
essence is difficult to put into words as we have seen in
the examples above. Drawing on Anderson (1976), Reber
characterises procedural knowledge further by
distinguishing it from declarative knowledge, which is
here used as a synonym to propositional knowledge and
which points to its explicit character.
Anderson’s key distinction is that between
declarative knowledge, which is knowledge that
we are aware of and can articulate, and procedural
knowledge, which is knowledge that guides action
and decision making but typically lies outside of
the scope of consciousness. (Reber 1989: 16)
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While Reber makes a generic distinction between
procedural and declarative knowledge as tacit and
explicit respectively, this is not the complete picture
because some parts of procedural knowledge can be
made explicit. For example, in the example no.1 (above)
it is possible to have explicit instructions of how to build
the TEA laser. This explicit part of procedural
knowledge is called propositional or conceptual content
(Williams 2001: 140, Gunther 2003). The other part,
which is tacit and which is accordingly called nonconceptual or non-propositional content, is not yet well
understood because it seems persistently to evade
articulation and to lie beyond any norms of declarative
knowledge.
Although I have introduced the concept of propositional
content in the context of procedural knowledge, it is
more commonly associated with experience or
perception. This brings us to the third of the recognised
categories: knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by
acquaintance is more often talked about as experiential
knowledge, as perceptual knowledge, or as sensual
knowledge. The term ‘sensual knowledge’ is used to
connote the unmediated reception of external reality
through the senses. ‘Perceptual knowledge’ is used to
connote the reception of external stimuli mediated
through human faculties (Maund 2003: 58/59).
‘Experiential knowledge’ is used in Williams (2001: 6980) to connote the entirety of both, which is the sense in
which I will use it in this paper. However, the notion of
experiential knowledge is not uncontentious. Because of
its phenomenal nature, experiential knowledge is
sometimes disregarded in terms of having a status as
knowledge:
“Having a headache isn’t knowledge though you
certainly experience (are acquainted with) the
headache; but knowing that you have a headache
is. Seeing some colours in your visual field isn’t
knowledge; but forming concepts from your
sensations and recognising that it’s an animal
stalking in the underbush, is. You couldn’t have
knowledge without acquaintance, but
acquaintance alone is not yet knowledge.”
(Hospers 1990: 19)

knowledge, experiential knowledge can be associated
with displaying propositional and non-propositional
content. For example, in the example no.2 (above) one
may be able to experience the quality of a certain sound.
One may also be able to recognise what one’s experience
means (non-propositional content) and thus to name it
and to describe it (propositional content). However, one
may not be able to justify one’s experiential knowledge
other than through pointing back to one’s experience,
which means that it is not necessarily possible for others
to follow one’s judgement, and which may be seen to
distinguish it from propositional knowledge. Also, one
may not be able to describe one’s experiential knowledge
adequately with regard to replication (cf. example no.1).
This indicates that the part of experiential knowledge that
allows us to make sense of our experience seems elusive
to articulation. Equally elusive to articulation is the part
of procedural knowledge that allows us to act upon it as
we have seen above. Thereby the latter seems based
strongly on the former. Further, through the propositional
content, both experiential and procedural knowledge
seem closely related to propositional knowledge, while
propositional knowledge seems to receive its meaning
from the experience that tacitly underlies it (Neuweg
2002). For example, written language – as a prevalent
means of communication and storing knowledge – is
constituted by arbitrary, socially agreed signs,
materialised e.g. with ink on paper, which mean nothing
until one knows and understands that these signs express
concepts and what they mean. (Neuweg 2002: 45)
From these considerations, I would like to draw some
tentative conclusions on the relationship between the
three kinds of knowledge by suggesting to understand
experiential knowledge as the basis for the other two
kinds of knowledge. In this sense, propositional
knowledge could be understood as the norms or
principles by which to understand experiential
knowledge, while procedural knowledge could be
understood as experiential knowledge in action. To avoid
misunderstanding, I would like to add that this
proposition remains firmly rooted in Williams’
contextualist framework, and is not a fallback to
foundationalist principles, but simply tries to describe in
more detail the relationship between the different kinds
of knowledge (Illustration 1).

This problem points us back to, and is ameliorated by the
idea of propositional content, because like procedural
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Propositional Knowledge

Procedural Knowledge

Terms taken to be synonyms of propositional
knowledge for the purpose of this study:
• declarative knowledge (education, phil.)
• codified knowledge (education, phil.)
• cognitive knowledge (psychology)
• conceptual knowledge
• theoretical knowledge

Terms taken to be synonyms of procedural
knowledge for the purpose of this study:
• Practical knowledge
• Skills knowledge

Terms used to denote the relation of
propositional knowledge to communication:
• explicit knowledge

Terms used to denote the relation of
procedural knowledge to communication:
• Tacit knowledge
• implicit knowledge
• ineffable knowledge

Experiential Knowledge
Sensuous knowledge / perceptual knowledge
Terms taken to be synonyms of experiential knowledge for the purpose of this study:
• embodied knowledge
• personal knowledge
Terms used to denote the relation of experiential knowledge to communication:
• tacit knowledge
• implicit knowledge
• ineffable knowledge
Illustration 1: the relationship of propositional, procedural, and experiential knowledge

5 TACIT KNOWLEDGE & RESEARCH
Having discussed the nature of, and relational model for
the three different kinds of knowledge, we now need to
discuss the format of these different kinds of knowledge
before we can consider the benefit of this inquiry for
design research in terms of the desired inclusion of tacit
knowledge within research in the conclusion.
Above, we have seen that propositional knowledge is
usually associated with explicit knowledge, while nonpropositional (experiential/procedural) knowledge is
usually associated with tacit knowledge. However, as we
have discussed in section 4, there is a tacit component
(non-propositional content) to propositional knowledge,
which allows it for us to become meaningful, and there is
an explicit component (propositional content) to nonpropositional knowledge, which allows for its partial
communication. This indicates that the notion of explicit
and tacit knowledge cannot simply be associated with
propositional and non-propositional knowledge
respectively, but that these concepts overlay one another
‘orthogonally’, and that the concept of explicit and tacit
knowledge rather pertains to the notions of propositional
and non-propositional content. (Illustration 2)
Design Inquiries 2007: Mapping Knowledge in Design Research

In section 2, we have seen that current notions of
research are intrinsically related to the notion of
propositional knowledge because of matters of logic and
communication and that research has no problem with
propositional knowledge, because it can be made explicit
through verbal means, which adheres to research
requirements. Following our conclusion of the
orthogonal relationship of propositional/nonpropositional and explicit/tacit knowledge, I want to
replace the notion of propositional knowledge in this
context with that of propositional content, and that of
non-propositional knowledge with non-propositional
content. Rephrasing the above in this light, this means
research has no problem with explicit knowledge or
propositional content of knowledge. However, there have
been problems with the aspect of tacit knowledge or nonpropositional content. By its nature, tacit knowledge
evades research due to the current requirements of
research. On the one hand, tacit knowledge therefore
lacks recognition in research, while on the other hand our
examples have shown that tacit knowledge is vital both
for the development and communication of knowledge in
research in design and other CDPs.
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Explicit Knowledge
(=propositional content)
Propositional
Knowledge

Nonpropositional
knowledge

Tacit Knowledge
(=non-propositional content)

Illustration 2: orthogonal relationship of propositional
and non-propositional knowledge to explicit and tacit
knowledge.
In the following, it therefore seems important to
investigate why non-propositional content remains tacit
and thus elusive to research and how one might deal with
it. Three questions are worth considering here: i) Why is
tacit knowledge tacit? ii) What are the problems with
being tacit for research? and iii) How can they be
overcome?
i) There are several sources that consider why nonpropositional content is tacit. Most prominantly, Polanyi
(1958: 55) explains it with the concept of focal and
subsidiary awareness. A common example is driving a
car where one needs to be aware of the road and the way
one is going (focal awareness) while operating the car
without being conscious all the time of single actions
with the pedals, gear-stick etc. (subsidiary awareness).
This kind of split awareness has the great benefit that we
are able to act, because would we have to be aware of all
stimuli and subsidiary actions all of the time, we would
not be able to act at all.
ii) If tacit knowledge has this great benefit, we have to
consider next what are the problems with it for
knowledge creation within research? The main argument
why there are problems is that research requires a
conscious scrutiny of knowledge for the purpose of
verification. While propositional content is open to this
scrutiny, because it can be made explicit by verbal
means, tacit knowledge seems to evade it. This has raised
the question whether the tacit knowledge can be regarded
as knowledge at all. If we follow Williams (2001: 175)
who argues that we can speak of beliefs as knowledge if
they can be verified, we may conclude that tacit
knowledge should be regarded as knowledge if we can
show that it can be verified. That tacit knowledge can be
verified, I would argue, becomes most obvious in relation
to procedural knowledge (as knowledge in action) where
every action constitutes a judgement over what is right
Design Inquiries 2007: Mapping Knowledge in Design Research

(to do) in every given moment and thus the knowledge is
tacitly verified within and through action. We can
explain this further if we assume with Williams (2001)
that the two content states of knowledge are inseparable
(100), and that therefore even where we speak of tacit
knowledge, propositional content is involved albeit it has
not been made explicit. We can therefore assume
experiential and procedural knowledge to adhere to
normativity and judgement – even when tacit – and that
the judgement can be made explicit ‘posthumously’
through analysis and explanation.
In conclusion, this analysis seems to indicate that there
are no intrinsic problems with the understanding and
inclusion of tacit knowledge and further of nonpropositional knowledge(s) in research as such.
However, despite of this positive assessment there seem
to remain some practical problems with the integration
and communication of tacit knowledge in research,
because of the requirement for the explicit analysis and
explanation, i.e. justification, which is required for
example by university regulations and regulations of
national research funding bodies in the UK, such as
AHRC (2006) and RAE (2005).
iii) The problem with communicating tacit knowledge in
research discussed under ii) concerns on the one hand the
integration of tacit knowledge into research, and on the
other hand it concerns the communication of tacit
knowledge that is part of the findings of any research.
Firstly, concerning the inclusion of tacit knowledge in
research, designers and other practitioners have taken to
using practice as part of their research in order to be able
to draw on the tacit knowledge inherent in their practice.
Above, we have discussed that in principle there should
not be any problem with the inclusion of tacit knowledge.
However, the lack of clarity about knowledge has led to a
lack of clarity about how to use practice within research
(e.g. Biggs 2002, 2004, Durling et al. 2002). These
problems pertain both to research regulations as well as
research practice. For example, although research
regulations (e.g. AHRC 2006) formally allow practice
into the research process, they do not explicitly specify
its purpose or role within research. In terms of research
practice and methodological conduct, the lack of
specification as well as of the understanding of
knowledge has led to a loose use of practice within
research which in turn has caused problems with the
recognition of the validity of using practice as a method
and means in research for making tacit knowledge
available to the research process.
These considerations suggest that this problematic can be
overcome firstly by an appropriate framing of practiceled inquiry within research. A very good example is
Whiteley’s research into the development of artificial
limbs through drawing and modelling (Whiteley 2000).
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They suggest further that, secondly, an explicit
acknowledgement of the intrinsic importance and role of
tacit knowledge in the research process through research
regulations and research requirements would be of
benefit to research in the creative and practice-led
disciplines as well as the provision of clear guidelines of
how to do so.
The second problem, which concerns the communication
and sharing of tacit knowledge for application in
practice, is more profound. Neuweg (2002: 45) sums this
problem up in pragmatic terms, declaring that “although
tacit knowledge is not teachable, it is coachable.”
This indicates that there is an intrinsic problem with the
communication of research, which has significant
consequences for the dissemination of research as well as
on research education, and suggests that rethinking these
issues is required to progress the identified problems. In
particular, this problem will need further research to
establish appropriate methods and procedures to
overcome the problem. While there have been many
approaches to this problem, these are situated in different
areas such as knowledge management (e.g. Nonaka and
Takeuchi 1995, e.g. Nonaka, et al. 2006), education
(e.g.Neuweg 2004), nursing (e.g. Higgs and Titchen
2001), and need analysis and synthesis for application to
the problem of research in design and CPDs.

6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This research has investigated the meaning, role and
format of knowledge in research and practice, with
particular reference to research in the creative and
practice-led disciplines. To this end, we discussed that
problems with the recognition of tacit knowledge within
research have arisen because of the implicit prioritisation
of propositional or explicit knowledge in research, and
we used some examples to analyse the nature of these
problems. We established that tacit knowledge plays an
essential role in our ability to obtain highest
achievements in practice as well as in research, often
expressed as expertise and connoisseurship, and that
therefore the deliberate inclusion of tacit knowledge
within research is important and necessary.
In order to understand better how to include tacit
knowledge within research, e.g. through the use of
practice within research, in sections 3 and 4, we
examined the meaning and relationship of the prevalent
concepts of knowledge in philosophy. The discussion has
sought to clarify the meaning and relationships of
prevalent concepts such as propositional and nonpropositional knowledge (including experiential and
procedural knowledge), propositional and nonpropositional content, and explicit and tacit knowledge.
Section 5 has used the understanding of knowledge
Design Inquiries 2007: Mapping Knowledge in Design Research

gained in the previous sections to consider knowledge
with regard to its format of communication, and with
regard of the consequences of this for the role and format
of knowledge, in particular tacit knowledge, in research.
We concluded that there is no fundamental problem with
including both propositional and non-propositional
knowledge in the research process, e.g. by means of
using practice, because non-propositional knowledge,
too, has propositional content, which can be made
explicit, and by means of which its use can be
acknowledged. However, we found that there are
problems concerning the communication of the outcomes
of research, because the non-propositional/tacit
component of knowledge is at least equally important as
its explicit counter part for the applicability of any
outcomes in practice or in further research, and because
tacit knowledge by its nature evades verbalisation and
therefore evades communication, dissemination and
knowledge sharing.
With regard to methodology and conduct, this research
suggests therefore that it would be desirable for future
research to analyse and synthesise existing approaches
for non-verbal communication (e.g. [video]
demonstration, coaching etc.), and to map them in order
to make them available for application to the problem of
research. With regard to research policy (regulations and
requirements), it would be important to acknowledge the
existence and importance of non-propositional/tacit
knowledge, how it can be included under current
requirements, and how research results can be
communicated inclusive of its tacit component to
facilitate application in practice.

REFERENCES
Abidi, S. S. R., Cheah, Y.-N. & Curran, J. (2005). A
Knowledge Creation Info-Structure to Acquire and
Crystallize the Tacit Knowledge of Health-Care Experts.
IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in
Biomedicine, 9 (2).
AHRC. (2006). Details of the Research Grants Scheme.
Retrieved July 2006, from URL: http://www.ahrc.ac.uk.
Anderson, J. R. (1976). Language, memory, and thought.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Author’s reference. (2007). Analysing the Meaning of
Knowledge in the Definition of Research. European
Academy of Design Conference 2007. Izmir, Turkey:
(publication forthcoming).
Author’s reference. (2006). Reviewing the
Understanding of Experiential Knowledge in Research in
Art & Design. [URL removed]
Author’s reference. (2005). Process and Product in
Doctoral Research (Seminar presentation, unpublished).

Page 8

Perspectives: AHRC Collaborative Doctoral Training.
Coventry University, UK, 30/05/2005.
Beeston, S. & Higgs, J. (2001). Professional practice:
artistry and connoisseurship. In J. Higgs and A. Titchen
(eds.), Practice Knowledge & Expertise in the Health
Professions. (108-120). Oxford, MA: Butterworth/
Heinemann.
Biggs, M. A. R. (2002). The Rôle of the Artefact in Art
and Design Research. International Journal of Design
Sciences and Technology, 10 (2), 19-24.
Biggs, M. A. R. (2004). Learning from Experience:
approaches to the experiential component of practicebased research. In H. Karlsson (ed.) ForskningReflektion-Utveckling. (6-21). Stockholm: Swedish
Research Council. Online at URL:
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/tvad/mb/2004a.pdf.

Berliner, D. (1994). Teacher Expertise. In B. Moon and
A. S. Hayes (eds.), Teaching and Learning in the
Secondary School. (107-113). Routledge.
BonJour, L. (2001). Epistemological Problems of
Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Online). Retrieved February 2006, from URL:
http://plato.stanford.edu/.
Collins, H.M. (1985). Changing Order. Replication and
Induction in Scientific Practice. London: Sage.
Crane, T. (2005). The Problem of Perception. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Online). January 2006,
from URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/.
Durling, D., Friedman, K. & Gutherson, P. (2002).
Editorial: Debating the Practice-Based PhD.
International Journal of Design Science and Technology,
10 (2), 7–18.
Eraut, M. (2003). The many Meanings of Theory and
Practice. Learning in Health and Social Care, 2 (2),
61–65.
Grayling, A. C. (2003). Epistemology. In N. Bunnin and
E. P. Tsui-James (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to
Philosophy. (37-60). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
Gunther, Y. H. (ed.) (2003). Essays on Nonconceptual
Content. Cambridge (MA) and London (UK): MIT Press.
Herbig, B., Büssing, A. & Ewert, T. (2001). The Role of
Tacit Knowledge in the Work Context of Nursing.
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 34 (5), 687-695.
Higgs, J. & Titchen, A. (1995). The Nature, Generation
and Verification of Knowledge. Physiotherapy, 81 (9),
521 - 530.
Higgs, J. & Titchen, A. (eds.) (2001). Practice
Knowledge & Expertise in the Health Professions.
Oxford, MA: Butterworth/Heinemann.

Design Inquiries 2007: Mapping Knowledge in Design Research

Hospers, J. (1990). An Introduction to Philosophical
Analysis. London: Routledge.
Maund, B. (2003). Perception. Chesham, UK: Acumen.
Miles, M., Melton, D., Ridges, M. & Harrell, C. (2005).
The Benefits of Experiential Learning in Manufacturing
Education. Journal of Engineering Technology, 22 (1),
24-29.
Neuweg, G. H. (2002). On Knowing and Learning:
Lessons from Michael Polanyi and Gilbert Ryle.
Appraisal, 4 (1), 41-48.
Neuweg, G. H. (2004). Könnerschaft und implizites
Wissen. Münster and New York: Waxmann.
Nonaka, I., Krogh, G. v. & Voelpel, S. C. (2006).
Organizational knowledge creation theory: Evolutionary
paths and future advances. Organization Studies, 27 (8),
1179-1208.
Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The KnowledgeCreating Company. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
RAE. (2005). RAE 2008: Guidance on Submissions. from
URL: http://www.rae2008.ac.uk.
Reber, A. (1989). Implicit Learning and Tacit
Knowledge. Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press.
Refsum, G. (2002). Bête comme un peintre? Working
Papers in Art & Design. Accessed February 2006, from
URL:http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes1/research/res2prac/co
nfhome.html.
Starszakowna, N. (2002). The Concept of Knowledge.
Working Papers in Art & Design. Retrieved January
2006, from URL:
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes1/research/res2prac/confho
me.html.
Sternberg, R. J. (1999). Epilogue - What Do We Know
about Tacit Knowledge? Making the Tacit Become
Explicit. In R. J. Sternberg and J. A. Hovarth (eds.), Tacit
Knowledge in Professional Practice. (231-236).
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Whiteley, G. (2000). An Articulated Skeletal Analogy of
the Human Upper-Limb (PhD thesis). Sheffield Hallam
University, UK.
Williams, M. (2001). Problems of Knowledge: a critical
introduction to epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.

Page 9

